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Abstract  
Unlike in developing countries, there tends to be no problem of access to water, 
electricity, and heating for private households in transition countries. However, 
transition countries have a considerable amount of low-income households, and the 
problem of affordability of these environmental-related utility services remains urgent. 
Welfare economics literature suggests to neglect affordability aspects by separating 
allocative from distributive impacts of pricing. In practice, this separation runs the risk 
of rendering impossible any sustainability-oriented price reform. An Institutional 
Economics approach takes competing objectives into account. From this viewpoint it 
appears to be worth investigating the affordability-concept.  
 
Although the affordability-related research has escalated remarkably in recent years, 
the theoretical contributions are still limited. Hence, we focus on the simple ratio 
measure often used in practice. We analyze the arguments speaking for the ‘potential 
affordability approach’. But we find that - within that approach – adhering formally to 
the ratio measure is possible only under conditions that make no sense regarding the 
concern of the measure. Thus for most cases the ratio measure is misleading. Some 
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1  TRANSITION ECONOMIES, INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, AND 
AFFORDABILITY  
Considerations which connect disadvantaged households and environmental-related 
utility services, such as water, electricity, and heating, often distinguish the problem of 
access from the problem of affordability. The problem of access refers to the 
availability of the necessary infrastructure, whereas the affordability refers to 
household’s financial burden for the consumption. Access is a much more basic 
problem and affordability is a problem arising effectively, when the previous one is 
solved. 
 
While in developing countries one struggles with the very basic problem of 
infrastructure, i.e. access, this aspect is ‘less relevant for transition countries, where 
connection rates are generally high.’ (FANKHAUSER/TEPIC 2005: 1038). However, the 
problem of affordability remains a major challenge for questions of governance and 
institutional design in transition economies like Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. This is due to remarkable escalation of poverty during the last two decades. 
FANKHAUSER and TEPIC found that on average (sic) a household has no affordability 
problem in these countries (see ibid.: 1046). But they stress a considerable number of 
low-income households for whom affordability of utility goods is an existential issue. 
MACOURS and SWINNEN (2008) investigated the fact, that and how poverty is 
outspread especially in rural areas of transition countries. In the future the affordability 
problems might be aggravated by the fact that price increases for environmental-
related utility services are very likely. 
 
The recent efforts in affordability research so far was mainly of empirical nature. 
However, economic theory appears to be stupendously ill-prepared for such an urgent 
problem.
1 Neoclassical welfare economics literature suggests to neglect affordability 
aspects by separating allocative from distributive impacts of pricing (second 
fundamental theorem of welfare economics). Yet in political practice, this approach 
runs the risk of rendering impossible any sustainability-oriented price reform. 
Therefore, we apply an Institutional Economics approach instead: In the following we 
want to investigate theoretically the simplest of the affordability measures, the so-
called affordability ratio, with the aid of the microeconomic household model. Having 
the concern of the affordability-concept at the back of our mind, we intend to see, to 
what extent the ratio-measure may reasonably serve as underlying measure for 
institutional design of utility service provision. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we show how the target ratio can be 
defined, with the aid of a standard minimum level of consumption. Section 3 discusses 
conceivable factual situations of household consumption. In section 4 we present a 
transformation of the factual into a fictitious consumption situation according to the 
mentioned standard level (‘potential affordability approach’). Section 5 describes 
reasonable variation of this standard level. Therein finally our main argument against 
the ratio measure is presented. Section 6 concludes and points to the possible relevance 
for institutional design in fighting unaffordability of utility services. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Theoretical investigation can be found though so far in HANCOCK (1993), CHAPLIN/FREEMAN (1999), 
GLIED (2008), MINIACI ET AL. (2008), and KESSIDES ET AL. (2009). 
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2   DEFINING THE TARGET RATIO 
The idea of affordability refers to the burden a household has to bear in order to attain 
a certain good. The very common formalization of affordability is the burden ratio. It 
is the ratio of expenditures pq for the considered utility service (index good u) to the 
total income x of the household k.










Following the intention and concern of the idea, its flaws mentioned in the discussion 
are to be picked up: 
1.  There is no correlation to a certain minimum consumption level of the index good. 
Poor households consuming a very/too small quantity of the good are considered 
having no affordability problem. 
2.  Similarly, there is no correlation to a maximum consumption level of the index 
good. Wealthy households wasting the good are possibly considered as having a 
affordability problem. 
3.  Households are characterized by the following circumstances: different amounts of 
members (household size), different climatic/regional conditions, and different 
technological endowments. These conditions lead to different individual necessity 
(see CHAPLIN/FREEMAN 1999: 1950). We are talking about some constraints that 
are not illustrated by the budget line. 
Subsequently, we will try to seize these suggestions 1-3, whereas the following is 
worked on in BRETSCHNEIDER 2010: 
4.  Important to (especially to disadvantaged) households is the quantity of the good.
3 
Since the numerator are the expenses (quantity multiplied by prices), different 
prices will distort the measure (see CHAPLIN/FREEMAN 1999: 1951). 
 
We intend to contour the affordability concept – following its inherent concern – as a 
concept focusing on the household’s ability to buy a certain good. KESSIDES ET AL. 
note accordingly: ‘[...] [I]t is often pointed out, in essence correctly, the issue is the 
ability to pay and not the willingness to pay [...].’ (KESSIDES ET AL. 2009: 3) This 
should be taken seriously particularly in front of the background of microeconomic 
theory. This theory tells us that a household´s decision for purchasing accords a 
syllogism. This means the action of purchasing is the conclusion of two premises: 
ability (restriction, Können) and willingness (preference, Wollen).
4 This is the 
difference the choice consists of. In the well-known diagram for defining the 
household´s optimum the first is traditionally represented by the budget line and the 
latter by the (family of) indifference curve(s). Thus we suggest to take care of the 
interplay of these two categories also particularly regarding the affordability issue.  
 
It is the concern of the approach to identify somewhat ‘poor’ or ‘disadvantaged’ 
households; individuals for whom the consumption of certain good is unaffordable. To 
                                                 
2 For purposes of empirical research, it could be discussed whether it is more convenient to use total 
expenditures instead of total income. For our theoretical considerations we regard these two categories 
as identic. Thus we use the symbol x for either category. 
3 Like widely in microeconomics we ignore quality aspects (that do of course play a role in reality). 
4 We are aware that widely in literature the term ‘willingness’ contains also the facet of ability. The 
‘willingness to pay’ consists of willingness (preferences) and ability. However, for our purposes we use 
‘willingness’ decided only meaning ‘preferences’. 
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define a differentiation, there is normatively introduced a critical level, the target 
burden r
u*.
5 Each household, whose ratio r is higher than the critical level r
u* is 
classified as suffering an affordability problem regarding u and is seen as 
disadvantaged or – in this respect – ‘poor’. We can see the relation to the general 
poverty-problem, if we regard the way the r decreases or increases. Pursuing the 
concern of the approach the relevant independent variable that determines the value r is 
the income xk. Figure 1 illustrates this correlation, based on the well-known two-
goods-model, wherein q
u stands for the quantity of the index good u. Reducing 
complexity drastically the abscissa q
c refers to the quantity of all other goods a 










S  A B  C  q
u* 
 
Fig. 1: Various income levels and accorded affordability-ratios 
based on a certain level of the index good. 
 
 
In figure 1 we can see several income levels represented by various budget lines; those 
parallel straight lines are showing a negative correlation of the two goods. And 
accordingly there are different affordability-ratios, represented by rays starting from 
the point of origin. The greater the ray’s slope, the greater is r; i.e. the higher is the 
burden the household has to bear. In the figure each budget line is attributed to a 
certain burden ray, as they intersect in the points A, B, C, and S. It becomes obvious: 
The higher the income, the more the burden slope declines; which means, the more the 
burden-ratio declines. Depending on the income the household might end up either in 
point A, B, C, or S. However, if one pursues this connectivity, it is – consciously or 
not – based on the assumption that all other relevant parameters remain constant. 
Important here is, that the consumed quantity of the index good u remains at the 
constant level q
u*. And this is probably what someone who applies the simple ratio 
measure has in mind implicitely. 
 
Let us call the scenario shown above (especially in figure 1) an ability-related shifting 
of the burden ratio. Now, the microeconomic model offers a second way to let the 
burden ray shift. The burden ratio might change also on a given budget line. That 
would be a willingness-related shifting. Thus, if the affordability-ratio should be given 
                                                 
5  HANCOCK (1993: 128) calls it ‘target affordability ratio’. CHAPLIN/FREEMAN (1999: 1951) use the 
term ‘benchmark ratio’. Others call it ‘burden-threshold’ (see i.e. OECD 2003: 43). 
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the original intention it is necessary to define explicitely a certain quantity ‘necessary 
to reach a decent standard of living’ (KESSIDES ET AL. 2009: 11). In figure 1 this is the 
level q
u*. In this respect we follow MINIACI and KESSIDES with their ‘standard 
minimum level of consumption’ (MINIACI ET AL. 2008: 203 and KESSIDES ET AL. 2009: 
14) within the ‘potential affordability approach’. 
 
Now, there are aftermaths of this explicity. We cannot say anymore, that this is the 
level households actually use; that this is a factual standard. In the syllogism 
mentioned above the actual use is the conclusion. Now we rather have to acknowledge 
that the level q
u* is a normative standard. Nota bene: The methodic decision to engage 
in this standard is not driven by theoretical imperatives once one works within the 
microeconomic model. But it is driven by the original concern of affordability seen 
through the microeconomic approach ‘glasses’. In the syllogism mentioned above the 
normative standard belongs formally to the side of willingness (Wollen). But whereas 
economists are used to the normative category of the individual preference, we are 
entering the difficult field of and discussion on merit wants. And this is the methodical 
difficulty one catches with that decision: One has to define somehow a level of 
consumption, which a fictional benevolent dictator wants the citizens to reach. But 
instead of going into the discussion about criteria which might help finding this level,
6 
it is important for our purposes to observe that this normative level is (almost always) 
different to the factual individually purchased quantities. So this is the base on which 
we can shift the budget line/ray-intersection on in the diagram.  
 
To go on we want to pick up the aspect of the target ratio r
u*. We mentioned that this 
is to be given normatively. Having a norm of minimum consumption only for the 
index good u, we still have no target ratio; the ray is still shifting. What we need is a 
second normative consumption level as reference level, namely for all other goods c. 
The point where the two minimum consumption levels intersect is then called the 
subsistence bundle; point S in figure 1. And the ray of reference r
u* is fixed then in the 
subsistence bundle.
7 The rays of all households defined by budget and standard 
consumption level are compared to this ray of reference. Those whose ray’s slope is 
higher than r
u* are considered as facing affordability problems. Inversely for 
households whose ray’s slope is less than r
u* the index good u is considered 
affordable. 
 




















                                                 
6 Simplifying we could say – like often – that this definition should be given exogenously economists by 
the democratic public/society. 
7 In MINIACI’s and KESSIDES’ diagram the ray of the target ratio does not cross the subsistence bundle 
(see MENIACI et al. 2008: 202 and KESSIDES et al. 2009, 12). We think that the target ray is to cross 
point D, in order to get a consistent notion of affordability ratio. 
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Consequently, if we uncover the normative expression r
u* we can discover the 
normative levels q
u* and q
c*. We want to stress this point: defining the target 
affordability requires two normative definitions of quantity levels in advance. In this 
(normative) way the idea of opportunity costs is inherent to the target affordability-
ratio. Thus we think it is an inappropriate statement by HANCOCK who says that it ‘[…] 
makes little sense to define affordability in terms of the ratio […] if it is believed that 
opportunity cost is important.’ (HANCOCK 1993: 133) The phenomenon of opportunity 
costs is rather perfectly implemented in the burden ratio. One could positively talk 
about a ‘normative opportunity cost clip’. Furthermore with this background the 
following definition can be understood deeper. ‘’Affordability’ is concerned with 
securing some given standard [consumption of the index good u] at a price […] which 
does not impose, in the eyes of some third party (usually government) an unreasonable 
burden on households incomes.’ (MACLENNAN/WILLIAMS 1990: 9, as cited in 
HANCOCK 1993: 129) This ‘unreasonable burden’, which is often mentioned regarding 
the affordability problem, refers to falling below the second normatively standardized 
level, the quantity q
c* – considering q
u* being fixed.  
 
In the following section we will take a step back investigating factual situations 
households may end up in compared to these normative standards. The considered 
differences are underconsumption vs. non-undersonsumption and ability-related 
underconsumption vs. willingness-related underconsumption. Beside the subsistence 
bundle (see point S in figure 1) the budget line which intersects the subsistence bundle 
plays a major role. We want to call it target budget (see straight line b* in figure 1). 
 
 
3   THE ATTRIBUTES OF FACTUAL CONSUMPTION BUNDLES 
This income represented by the target budget line b* is necessary to reach the 
subsistence bundle. We will now examine its implications in combination with the 
quantitative standard levels of consumption for both goods u and c (see figure 2). 
Remember that these are the levels some third party wishes all households to consume 
at least. However, the factual consumption bundle of the individual household may be 
realized in each of the raising areas, caused – following the syllogism – by the 
household’s budget line (restriction, ability) as well as his individual utility function 
(preference, willingness). We want to describe what it means a household ending up in 
a certain area by considering four cases (see figure 2): (a) non-underconsumption 
(grided area), (b) willingness deficiency-related underconsumption (striped area), (c) 
mixed-conditioned underconsumption (light grey area), and (d) ability deficiency-
related underconsumption (dark grey area). 
 
(a) Non-underconsumption (grided area): This is the area a benevolent dictator wants 
all individuals to end up in. Households therein are not facing any underconsumption 
problem, there is no problem for social policy. This is caused by two conditions: First, 
the household has a budget in his disposal which is greater than the target budget b*. 
Second, on his budget line the household chooses a consumption bundle which avoids 
an underconsumption for both u and c. Considering critic no. 2 to the ratio measure on 
page 4, herein we have the cases of wasting-related unaffordability. In the diagram 
these are grided area-households ending up above the (in figure 2: imaginary) target 
ray. In all the other areas, the households underconsume either the good u or c or both. 
The different causes for the underconsumption are examined in the following 
paragraphs.  










Fig. 2: Areas between the target budget line and  
the levels of minimum consumption. 
 
 
(b) Willingness deficiency-related underconsumption (striped area): Households in the 
striped areas possess an income which actually enables them to achieve an appropriate 
consumption level for both goods, like the households in the grided top right area. 
However, they just do not choose accordingly. These are the households HANCOCK 
takes into consideration in her article ‘Can pay? Won’t pay?’ (HANCOCK 1993) where 
she indicates a ‘perversity of preferences’ (ibid: 131). 
 
What we are facing here is not a deficiency of ability (Könnensdefizit), rather a pure 
deficiency of willingness (Wollensdefizit).
8 So we are dealing with the pure problem 
of meritoric wants and not with questions of distribution in a narrow sense. Considered 
graphically the paternalistic third party would like the household to move on his 
budget line until the grided area starts. This is to reduce the consumption of the 
‘overconsumed’ good in favour of the underconsumed one. The liberal tradition 
starting with JOHN  STEWART  MILL has been warning against interfering with the 
individual’s autonomy. At least the barriers of legitimation for an intervention are 
highly demanding. 
 
(c) Mixed-conditioned underconsumption (light grey area): In the monochrome filled 
areas the lack in ability plays a major role finally. Here the households have an income 
available smaller than the target budget b*. So the households in this light grey area 
cannot reach the subsistence bundle, but they are already somehow making a wrong 
decision anyway. They are underconsuming one good but, at the same time already 
consuming more than is necessary from the other. Here we are facing a deficiency of 
both ability and willingness. Accordingly, a meritoric and a distributional problem 
arise at the same time.
9 Considered graphically the paternalistic third party would like 
                                                 
8 As an additional reason for ending up in the brindled areas HANCOCK introduces the category of ‘non-
income constraints’ (see HANCOCK 1993: 130). We will pick up this problem below in section 5. 
9 At the outset we stressed the difference between the two premises ability and willingness. All the more 
it is interesting now, when problems in this category coincide. In such a way RICHARD MUSGRAVE 
observes factual casual coincidence of meritoric and distributive problems. JOHN HEAD rather sees a 
more essential connectivity (see HEAD 1988: 6). 
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the household to shift on his budget line at least until the dark grey area starts. That is 
to say, to reduce the consumption of the ‘overconsumed’ good in favour of the 
underconsumed one; to underconsume the latter less intense. Systematically after this 
motion – that is the difference to the same scenario in the striped area – the problem of 
ability could be tackled.  
 
(d) Ability deficiency-related underconsumption (dark grey area): These households 
consume insufficient quantities of both goods due to a pure distributional problem, 
with an actual deficiency of ability (Könnensdefizit). This area includes those who ‘do 
not even have the opportunity to make [an] inappropriate decision.’ (GLIED 2008: 
15).
10 The part below the imaginary target ray represents those households the 
objective no. 1 aims at, above on page 4. 
 
In the following section we will see what happens if we ‘guide’ such a factual 
consumption bundle to a fictitious situation, according a certain standardized minimum 
level, as regarded in section 2. 
 
 
4   DIAGNOSIS OF A HOUSEHOLDS AFFORDABILITY SITUATION 
In this section we finally aim at getting the affordability ratio that expresses 
exclusively the deficiency of ability (Könnensdefizit) of a household. Doing this we 
pursue the ‘potential affordability approach’ and we will see how it actually works in 
the model. After our considerations in previous sections we now are able to combine 
the standard level-oriented definition of the r-ray (section 2) and the classifications of 
the factual household’s situation (section 3). 
 
Above, in section 1 we mentioned that it is necessary to shift from the factual 
consumption bundle to a certain fictive consumption bundle. Namely to end up on the 
parallel line of the abscissa on the level q
u*, in order to be able to scale the 
affordability-ratio right there. But this motion is not to be taken perpendiculary, i.e. 
parallel to q
c*-straight line. It is rather to be taken along the budget line of the 
household (see figure 3). In other words: In order to end up in the fictional 
consumption bundle on the q
u*-straight line, we move from the factual bundle right on 




If we look at the areas examined above, we see that – employing this method – none of 
the households with a factual consumption bundle in the grided top right area is now 
considered facing unaffordability. They all end up fictionally to the right of S. Thus the 
definition problem of unaffordability due to over-consumption is solved (objection no. 
2 is solved). In the same manner all households with a pure deficiency of willingness 
are ending up to the right of S. In figure 3 there is a household with a factual 
consumption bundle in the formerly brindled top left area, represented by the point at 
the arrow’s origin. Shifting on his budget line until the q
u*-straight line he ends up 
fictionally with the affordability-ray r
1, to the right of S; that is, with a affordability 
ratio smaller than the target affordability r
u*. Hence, the problem of objection no. 4 is 
solved. 
                                                 
10 In figure 1 these are households with a budget equal and smaller than the budget that intersects the 
ordinate at . 




















Fig. 3: Motion from the factual to the fictional consumption bundle. 
 
 
Maybe the most interesting cases are the households in the light grey area of figure 2. 
Therein we observed a deficiency of both ability and willingness. All these households 
are considered as facing affordability problems; they do all end up to the right of S. 
But since the deficiency of willingness is eliminated they end up not that far to the left. 
In figure 3 we can see this for the household, which ends up with the affordability-ratio 
r
2, having a higher slope than r
u*. With this motion we feign the unconditional priority 
for the standard consumption level q
u*. And by doing this we eliminate at the same 
time  uno actu all deficiency of willingness.
11 Thus we come to an affordability 
definition that refers to the deficiency of ability only. 
 
Then, having all households on q
u*-line we can scale the affordability problem of the 
household, either by measuring the distance to point S (subsistence bundle) or by 
measuring the slope of the corresponding r-ray. All housholds that end up to the left of 
S and whose r-ray features a greater slope than r
u*, are facing an affordability problem. 
And accordingly: All households ending up to the right of S and whose r-ray features a 
smaller slope than r
u* are not facing an affordability problem. Nota bene: Additionally 
we can scale the ‘depth’ of the affordability problem. The greater the distance to the 
point S on the left side, the bigger the affordability problem. Accordingly this 
consideration asks for an institutional design that helps all households on the left 
reaching point S. 
 
 
5   VARIATION JUSTIFIED BY NON-INCOME RESTRICTIONS 
The potential affordability approach helps to contour the affordability concept as a 
concept considering ability-deficiency. This approach is the answer to objections 1 and 
2 mentioned on page 4. This is the point where we are so far. But somehow we ended 
up in a dead end street regarding the somehow shrewd feature of this proportional term 
to react flexible. And that is what a ratio and proportion intends to be: To represent a 
                                                 
11 For eliminating the deficiency of willingness only it already would be sufficient on the motion to the 
q
u*-straight line, to stop at the q
c*-line, if this line is intersected first. 
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common measure for different fundamentals. The target point S makes sense as giving 
an orientation. But our former considerations suggest, that the ray in the dark grey area 
as well in the grided area (see figure 2) make are pretty much useless. Thus the 
question which arises is: Why and how would it make sense to adhere to a target ratio 
and target line (r
u*) instead of just a target point S? 
 
At this point another objection to the affordability ratio might help (sic). An aspect we 
did not integrate so far is objection 3 on page 4. It refers to different circumstances 
different households are facing, like 
-  different amounts of household members (size), 
-  different climatic/regional conditions, and 
-  different technological endowments (see KESSIDES et al. 2009: 15).  
It is advisable here to go back to the difference of ability and willingness, and to see 
what we are dealing with now. The side of ability is represented by the budget (line). 
However, the side of willingness was a bit more complicated. On the one hand we 
have the individual preferences (i.e. utility functions), which determine the realized 
point on the household’s budget line. But on the other hand there are (more) 
‘reasonable’ and standardized norms for certain quantities, given by a third party. It is 
typical for these two kinds of preferences that they are in conflict with each other. 
 
What we are facing now are individual household’s circumstances that drive a 
household to some preference. Consequently, on the market these motives emerge as 
individual preferences. But ‘lebensweltlich’ these ‘individual preferences’ are 
restrictions though. In order to name this phenomenon we want to pick up HANCOCK’s 
term ‘non-income constraints’ (see HANCOCK 1993: 130) could be utilized. This means 
they are to be taken into account on the side of ability (deficieny). Thus we have the 
income as a constraint inherent in the model, and now additionally some constraints 
that have to be additionally introduced into the model. The implications are illustrated 


















Fig. 4: Variation of the standard level of the index good u 
 and possible consequences for the standard level of all other goods 
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There may be a household with exact the target budget b*. Normally the standard 
minimum level of consumption is given with q
u*1. But due to certain particular 
necessities, the standard level for these cases may be at q
u*2. But on this line, in point 
T, the household falls below the level of reference q
c*. But what has to be done now is 
a bit unclear. The institutional design could orientate either on the level q
c* or on the 
affordability target ray  r
u*. And this could mean quite a difference between the 
distance TS2 and the distance TU (see figure 4). Actually it appears to be reasonable to 
stick to the level q
c*. Why should there be any proportional increase of q
c*? Thus a 
ratio approach is a somehow misleading measure. And this is the point, as we argue, 
where it becomes finally recommendable to leave any ratio approach, even a potential 
affordability approach.
12 A ‘residual income approach’ (see MENIACI et al. 2008: 206 
and KESSIDES et al. 2009: 15) appears to be more appropriate. It works with a 
difference instead of a ratio. But we cannot go into this further in this paper.  
 
 
6   ORIENTATION FOR DESIGNING INSTITUTIONS 
The affordability ratio has become a commonly used measure in social-oriented 
empirical studies. These efforts target at being the basic for according governance 
strategies and instruments. With our considerations we arrived at the conclusion so far, 
that there are good reasons to employ it at least carefully. There are basically ways to 
account for major objections within the logic of the ratio. But there remain doubts and 
our investigation suggests further research, in order to find more accurate ways to 
diagnose the underlying problem of disadvantage considering the consumption of a 
certain good. If the ratio measure as investigated was the basic for subsidies, an 
oversubsidization is conceivable at least. Thus more exactness regarding concepts of 
affordability is preferable. 
 
At the outset we referred to the problems of low-income households in transition 
countries, prevalent particularly in rural areas. Now ending up advising against over-
subsidization of disadvantaged households is of course no cynic rebound. The warning 
mentioned above is not meant against the social concern, but in contrary for the 
purpose of this concern. Against the background of scarcity, institutional designs in 
general and institutional designs particularly in regard to poverty have to be pinpoint. 
And scarcity here refers especially also to poverty somewhere else. It is no antagonism 
that social concerns should be pursued by taking aspects of efficiency into account.  
 
On top of that a better accuracy is preferable also because of the aspect of ecological 
sustainability. In this respect future prices of environmental-related utility services will 
probably increase. And this will happen with good cause. Hence institutions have to 
consider different important, but competing objectives. It remains the difficult task for 







                                                 
12 Nota bene: We are arguing like this as far as there is no sound justification for a proportional increase 
of q
c*. 
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